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Abstract
More than a decade after the inception of the KiwiSaver scheme, 
431,779 members remain in the default conservative fund into 
which they were automatically enrolled. These default members are 
in funds not consciously chosen and which may not be the most 
financially appropriate for them. A number of common human 
behavioural biases have likely contributed to why so many default 
members remain in the default funds. Although the fees charged by 
default funds are among the lowest in the market, such funds offer 
substantially lower returns than more growth-oriented funds. These 
lower returns are likely to lead to a significant shortfall in retirement 
savings and retirement standards of living for default members. This 
article summarises the main findings of a research project into these 
issues and presents policy options and recommendations. 
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Traditional neoclassical economics assumes that individuals are rational, self-interested and utility 
maximising (Mullainathan and Thaler, 
2000).1 Behavioural economics, on the 
other hand, takes a more realistic and 
behaviourally cognisant view of human 
behaviour based on evidence that human 
beings are fallible, easily confused in 
complex scenarios, unable to calculate 
risk accurately and more irrational than 
neoclassical theory would suggest. As an 
area of study, behavioural economics has 
a great deal to offer in considering how 
New Zealand’s national retirement savings 
scheme, KiwiSaver, should be designed.
The article proceeds as follows: first, 
background information on KiwiSaver is 
provided, then a summary of the literature 
review is presented, followed by an outline 
of the research’s main findings; behaviourally 
informed policy options are discussed, and 
to finish a short conclusion is offered.
The KiwiSaver scheme
After more than ten years, KiwiSaver has 
over 2.8 million members and has become 
a permanent feature of New Zealand’s 
savings sector (Financial Markets Authority, 
2018a). As of March 2018, however, 431,779 
KiwiSaver members (15.2% of total 
William Townsend is a Master of Public Policy student at Victoria University of Wellington and works 
in policy at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. A longer version of this article forms 
a component of the author’s MPP degree.
Behavioural Economics 
and Retirement Savings 
improving 
KiwiSaver
Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 4 – November 2018 – Page 85
membership) remained in the default 
conservative fund into which they were 
automatically enrolled. Collectively, these 
funds held over NZ$4.6 billion in assets 
in 2018, with around half of the default 
members (201,322) not actively contributing 
(ibid.). This number of default members has 
remained consistently high over time (ibid.) 
and there is growing concern that default 
fund members are missing out on potential 
retirement savings as a result (Parker, 2017, 
2018; New Zealand Herald, 2017; National 
Business Review, 2018). 
KiwiSaver is delivered by private scheme 
providers (30 in March 2018), with working 
individuals making contributions from 
paychecks at 3%, 4% or 8% and employers 
contributing a minimum of 3% (Heuser et 
al., 2015). In June 2018 the Taxation (Annual 
Rates for 2018–19, Modernising Tax 
Administration, and Remedial Matters) Bill 
was introduced into the House: it provides 
for additional contribution rates of 6% and 
10% and limits the length of contributions 
holidays to one year. 
KiwiSaver’s statutory purpose under 
the KiwiSaver Act 2006 is to encourage 
long-term savings and asset accumulation 
by those who would be unable to maintain 
their pre-retirement standard of living with 
solely New Zealand Superannuation. While 
not explicit purposes, increasing domestic 
saving levels and contributing to capital 
markets development have been identified 
by market participants and policymakers 
as additional objectives (ibid.).  
The programme uses a form of soft 
paternalism by allowing individuals to opt 
out between two and eight weeks after 
automatic enrolment. The benefits on offer 
to individuals are also significant, including: 
employer contributions; the ability to use 
some funds for buying a first home; (in 
some instances) a KiwiSaver HomeStart 
grant; and a government member tax credit 
of 50 cents in the dollar for employee 
contributions up to $1042.86. Some of these 
key features and benefits have been the 
subject of a number of changes by different 
governments, such as the contribution rates, 
tax liabilities, kick-start payment and 
member tax credit (Stephens, 2014).
As Figure 1 indicates, membership 
levels have grown substantially more than 
originally forecast by the Inland Revenue 
Department and Treasury (who forecast 
fewer than two million members) (Heuser 
et al., 2015). Growth of assets under 
management has also surpassed 
expectations, with just under NZ$50 
billion invested as of June 2018 (Douglas, 
2018) and forecasts of NZ$70–80 billion 
by 2020 (Heuser et al., 2015). 
KiwiSaver’s default fund automatic 
allocation system
Upon beginning employment for the first 
time or beginning new employment, a 
KS2 KiwiSaver deduction form must be 
completed by employees so that they can 
be automatically enrolled if they are not 
already a member or their contribution 
rate updated. Critically, the form does 
not allow a fund choice if the individual 
is being automatically enrolled (as there 
is only one default fund type) and only 
requires a contribution rate selection. 
This means that even those automatically 
enrolled members who wish to select their 
preferred fund are unable to do so. Default 
members are automatically and randomly 
allocated into one of the nine government-
appointed default provider funds, with a 
default contribution rate of 3% unless a 
different rate is consciously selected. 
KiwiSaver’s automatic allocation system 
into a default fund and contribution rate 
was chosen following evidence which 
suggested that in domains where individuals 
have low financial literacy and less than 
perfect information, default automatic 
enrolment produces considerably higher 
participation rates than voluntary enrolment 
(Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment, 2012). 
Asset allocations of default funds
The KiwiSaver default fund model was 
originally intended as a ‘temporary 
parking space’ from which default 
members would subsequently make 
a conscious fund choice (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2008). As a result, 
a conservative investment approach (an 
allocation to growth-oriented investments 
of between 15 and 25%) was taken, with 
the assumption that market forces would 
encourage members who would benefit 
from a more growth-oriented approach 
to switch funds (Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment, 2012). Just 
how conservatively invested the default 
funds are is depicted in Figure 2. The 
highest growth-oriented investment 
allocation is around 20%, with some funds 
below this (Financial Markets Authority, 
2018b). These KiwiSaver default funds 
are considerably more conservative than 
the closest equivalent funds in Australia, 
Britain, Chile and Sweden (MacDonald, 
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Bianchi and Drew, 2014). 
Longstanding investment theory states 
that more growth-oriented investments, 
while fluctuating more over the short term, 
tend to provide higher long-term returns 
than more conservative investments 
(Trainor, 2014). The decision to have a 
conservative default, then, was made 
despite well-known research, such as that 
from Madrian and Shea (2001), showing 
that in the absence of other significant 
saving (which is typically low in New 
Zealand), conservative default funds and 
low default contribution rates risk 
generating insufficient retirement savings. 
As a result of the choice architecture (i.e. 
the design) of the post-automatic 
enrolment system, the original expectation 
that individuals would switch out of default 
funds failed to eventuate for a substantial 
number of individuals, many of whom are 
likely to be less financially literate and 
capable than the average individual. A 
significant proportion of these individuals 
have remained in these potentially 
inappropriate default funds for many years 
(Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment, 2012).
Theory – behavioural biases likely 
influencing default members  
A number of behavioural biases (i.e. 
systematic patterns of deviation from 
rational human behaviour) appear to be 
influencing individuals to take and retain 
the default fund and contribution rate:
· bounded rationality: where individuals 
fail to act and/or make rationally 
calculated savings decisions because 
of the inherent complexity involved 
and limits in cognitive capacity 
(Madrian and Shea, 2001; Thaler and 
Benartzi, 2004; Benartzi and Thaler, 
2007; Beshears et al., 2013);
· inertia/procrastination: where individ-
uals suffer from inertia and procrasti-
nate when considering, making and 
revisiting key savings decisions and 
tasks (Akerlof, 1991; Madrian and 
Shea, 2001; Iyengar, Huberman and 
Jiang, 2004; Iyengar and Kamenica, 
2006, 2010; Choi et al., 2006; Beshears 
et al., 2013; Thaler, 2015; Blanchett, 
2017);
· passive decision making: where 
individuals take the path or option of 
least resistance in savings and retirement 
savings plan decisions and tasks 
(Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 
2006; Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; Lee, Xu 
and Hyde, 2013; Bateman et al., 2016);
· loss aversion: where individuals 
struggle to increase their savings or 
move into a higher risk fund because 
they dislike potential losses 
considerably more than they like 
potential gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Benartzi and Thaler, 
2007; Thaler, 2015);
· framing effects: where individuals make 
or accept certain savings decisions 
because of how the selection or choice 
is framed (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1982; Madrian and Shea, 2001; 
Sunstein and Thaler, 2003; Johnston, 
Tether and Tomlinson, 2015);
· present bias: where individuals struggle 
to save more or spend time considering 
savings decisions because they have 
limited self-control and willpower and 
prefer immediate gratification over 
future gains (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; 
Beshears et al., 2006; Stango and 
Zinman, 2009);
· status quo bias and anchoring/pure 
endowment effect: where individuals 
become anchored to default funds and 
contribution rates as the status quo and 
treat them as a superlative endowment 
(Sunstein and Thaler, 2003; Beshears et 
al., 2006; Johnston, Tether and 
Tomlinson, 2015; Thaler, 2015);
· endorsement effect: where individuals 
select or passively take, and often remain, 
with the default fund and contribution 
rate because of the conscious or 
unconscious interpretation that it is 
endorsed by the administrator or 
another authority, such as the 
government (Madrian and Shea, 2001; 
Beshears et al., 2006; Sunstein, 2013; 
Thaler, 2015; Blanchett, 2017).
Findings 
The research undertaken for this article 
generated a number of findings in relation 
to the fees charged and performance 
of KiwiSaver default funds versus other, 
conscious choice funds.
Default and conscious choice fund fees 
Default members pay lower fees both in 
dollar terms and as a percentage of funds 
held (most default funds charge between 
Figure 2: Asset Allocations of KiwiSaver Default Funds as of March 2018
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Source: Financial Markets Authority, 2018b
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0.6 and 0.7%) than those charged by most 
conscious choice conservative KiwiSaver 
funds. The default funds also charge lower 
fees than more growth-oriented conscious 
funds, although all conservative funds are 
likely to underperform more growth-
oriented ones over the long term. Despite 
default fees being limited by the default 
provider’s government appointment 
contracts, there is variation in default fund 
fees, the lowest being 0.58% and the highest 
0.91%. Such a seemingly small difference 
can have considerable cumulative effects 
on a default member’s final retirement 
savings, depending on which fund they 
are randomly allocated into. 
Default and conscious choice fund 
performance
There exists a substantial disparity in 
performance and returns between 
conservative funds (including all default 
funds) and more growth-oriented 
conscious choice funds (i.e. growth and 
aggressive funds). Growth-oriented funds 
have outperformed those in conservative 
and moderate risk categories in seven of the 
past ten years (Douglas, 2017). Specifically, 
peer group return averages for conscious 
choice growth funds are around double 
that of default funds over the five-year 
period to June 2018 (10.7% versus 5.9%) 
and still around one and a half times that 
of default funds over a ten-year period 
(8.4% versus 5.5%) (Douglas, 2018). One 
group of financial advisers has also claimed 
that default members’ KiwiSaver balances 
could have been up to 12% higher under 
a balanced fund and these members have 
missed out on about NZ$1 billion over the 
last six years (National Business Review, 
2018). Extrapolated over a lifetime, default 
funds will likely produce considerably lower 
returns and retirement savings outcomes 
than other, more growth-oriented 
conscious choice funds that would be more 
appropriate for many default members 
(e.g. given their age and other relevant 
circumstances).
Default system and fund performance 
disparity and individual/household-level 
retirement savings outcomes
At least for some groups of individuals, 
KiwiSaver has resulted in greater 
retirement savings than would have 
been achieved without the scheme (Law, 
Meehan and Scobie, 2017). However, the 
findings from the research show that 
contrary to the purpose of KiwiSaver, 
in the absence of other private saving 
over the long term, the default fund’s 
low returns and contributions will 
likely lead to low household net worth, 
unsatisfactory retirement standards of 
living, an over-reliance on New Zealand 
Superannuation and government welfare, 
and a resulting low level of financial 
independence (Frijns and Tourani-Rad, 
2015). This is in addition to the range of 
negative physical and psychological health 
impacts commonly associated with lower 
income households (Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment, 2012). 
While New Zealand Superannuation 
provides a minimum retirement income 
which partially mitigates the risk of 
insufficient retirement savings, it is 
unclear how long it will remain at its 
current levels or in its current form.
Behaviourally informed policy options
In what follows, three policy options to 
improve retirement savings outcomes 
are assessed, all of which are informed 
by behavioural economics. The three 
options are: 1) nudging current members 
out of default funds with a behavioural 
communication instrument; 2) policy 
changes to the default system; and 3) 
policy changes to increase employee 
contribution rates. These options are not 
mutually exclusive and could be combined 
in various ways to maximise outcomes.
Nudging current members out of default 
funds with a behavioural communication 
instrument
Around 330,000 default members have at 
least 15 years until retirement (Financial 
Markets Authority, 2018a). For many of 
these 330,000 individuals, the default 
fund is likely to be inappropriate based 
on the length of time remaining until 
their retirement and the low returns of the 
default funds. 
A prototype notification was developed 
using behavioural insights to nudge 
members to make conscious choices that 
will improve their retirement savings. This 
prototype notification (see Appendix) is 
included as an illustration of a possible 
communication designed to influence 
KiwiSaver members’ choices.
The prototype
The prototype notification was developed 
as the content of an email and/or printed 
letter to members in KiwiSaver annual 
statements. It is designed with reference 
to behavioural theory to take advantage of 
behavioural biases and to nudge members 
to make desirable conscious choices (e.g. 
switching out of their default fund). 
In line with Johnston, Tether and 
Tomlinson (2015) and the UK Behavioural 
Insights Team’s (2017) recommendations 
on behavioural insights and financial 
disclosure, the prototype contains only three 
key messages (with each clearly signposted). 
Where technical or detailed information is 
necessary it is either left for inclusion in a 
more detailed statement to minimise the 
cognitive loads of readers and avoid 
information overload. Critical words, 
phrases or numbers are emphasised in a 
different font colour and more complex 
fund performance information is presented 
graphically to improve the readability and 
simplify fund performance. 
In accordance with the identified 
behavioural biases, the communication 
attends to bounded rationality by 
simplifying complex information, 
A target date default fund would see 
the fund manager adjust investment 
risk and reduce growth asset allocation 
within the fund as the target retirement 
year approaches
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presenting technical return data as a simple 
graph, and colour-coding opening and 
closing balances to show the change in 
value. For example, the technical 
information and assumptions behind the 
total savings projection nudge were left to 
a footnote for further reference. The call to 
action of checking or updating the 
member’s fund is also simplified and 
inertia/procrastination and present bias are 
addressed by reversing the onus of action 
from the member to the provider, with a 
hyperlink/button which would notify the 
provider to call the member to discuss 
switching. 
Inertia/procrastination is one of the 
strongest behavioural biases influencing 
savings behaviour (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2009; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). As 
members may also be loss averse, the 
communication’s first key message is 
framed as a loss to the member of $9,250 
in potential returns over the last ten years 
as a result of not being invested in a more 
growth-oriented fund. In such a statement, 
the fund which the member’s savings 
would be compared to would depend on 
their unique individual information. 
In a similar way to framing a loss, the 
first sentence in the notification appeals to 
the tendency for individuals to desire 
conformance with social norms by pointing 
out that eight out of ten people the member’s 
age are in a more growth-oriented fund. 
Also, by posing the nudge as a question 
directed personally to the member, they are 
more likely to read and consider it (Financial 
Markets Authority, 2016). 
While subject to the availability of 
provider-specific data and not claiming to 
be perfectly designed, the prototype is a 
more behaviourally cognisant form of 
communicating complex KiwiSaver 
information to nudge member behaviour 
and choices than is typically used for 
KiwiSaver member communications. 
Policy changes to default fund 
Previous concern with the conservative 
default 
A decision to retain the conservative default 
was made at the first default provider 
review in 2012. This was despite officials 
stating that although a conservative 
approach reduced the risk of short-term 
losses from market fluctuations, it also 
had a greater likelihood of capital erosion 
from inflation and inadequate retirement 
savings through low returns (Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment, 
2012). Indeed, KiwiSaver providers, the 
Capital Markets Development Taskforce 
and the prime minister’s 2009 job 
summit have all voiced concern about 
the conservative default and argued for 
moving to a more growth-oriented default 
approach (Heuser et al., 2015). 
Proposed change
While any more growth-oriented 
alternative would offer greater returns for 
default members over time, the research 
concluded that a target date default fund 
would provide the greatest potential 
return for default members, at one of 
the lowest risks of retirement savings 
shortfall (MacDonald, Bianchi and Drew, 
2014). A target date default fund would 
see the fund manager adjust investment 
risk and reduce growth asset allocation 
within the fund as the target retirement 
year approaches (Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment, 2012). For 
example, with the current retirement age 
of 65, an individual born in 2000 and 
automatically enrolled in 2018 would 
enter a default fund with a target date of 
2065. Investment risk would be adjusted 
downwards over time as the individual 
nears their approximate retirement age in 
2065 (i.e. starting with a high proportion 
of growth-oriented assets and moving 
down to a low proportion).
A target date fund default system 
effectively mitigates the bounded 
rationality of individuals through 
simplifying complexity by not requiring 
a conscious choice from potentially 
uninformed or behaviourally biased 
investors at any point during their life. In 
this way, target date funds offer a simple 
to understand, ‘set and forget’ option for 
members that appeals to inertia/
procrastination, present bias, passive 
decision making and the status quo/
anchoring bias that hinder individuals 
from properly setting and regularly 
revisiting their retirement savings choices.
Under a target date KiwiSaver default 
fund, the risk of default members suffering 
a shortfall by retaining the default fund 
would be mitigated as the default target 
fund would dynamically invest to different 
risk profiles over time. While requiring 
moderate set-up costs, experimental results 
show that a dynamically managed life-stage 
fund, such as a target date fund, involves 
the least risk in terms of not reaching a 
common retirement goal of eight times 
final earnings (although New Zealand 
Superannuation reduces the amount 
needed for retirement in New Zealand) 
(MacDonald, Bianchi and Drew, 2014).
Policy changes to increase employee 
contribution rates 
Simply getting employees to think about 
the consequences of savings inadequacy 
is insufficient to produce meaningful 
behavioural change (Financial Markets 
Authority, 2016). The research canvassed 
different ways to increase savings rates 
which take account of human behavioural 
biases and found that an automatically 
escalating default contribution rate 
would offer improved retirement savings 
outcomes at minimal mental cost to 
members.
An auto-escalation system for contribution 
rates more appropriately targets 
behavioural biases of KiwiSaver members 
and averts the possible negative impacts 
that simply increasing the mandatory 
minimum KiwiSaver contribution rate may 
have on low-income savers.
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Automatic escalation 
An auto-escalation system for contribution 
rates more appropriately targets 
behavioural biases of KiwiSaver members 
and averts the possible negative impacts 
that simply increasing the mandatory 
minimum KiwiSaver contribution rate 
may have on low-income savers. 
As a behavioural nudge, auto-escalation 
would alter the choice architecture of the 
default contribution system so that a 
member’s contribution rate automatically 
(with an opt-out) escalates in increments 
each year over time up to a set cap. The 
creators of the original programme of 
automatically increasing savings rates, Save 
More Tomorrow (SMarT), found that after 
four annual increases 78% of those offered 
the plan joined; 80% of programme 
members remained in it after four annual 
increases; and over the course of 40 months 
the average savings rate for participants 
increased from 3.5% to 13.6% (Thaler and 
Benarzti, 2004)
In the absence of any separate increase 
to the minimum KiwiSaver contribution 
rate, the yearly automatic increase in 
contribution rates could, for example, 
increase in 0.5% increments each year from 
3% up to a maximum of 10% after 14 years. 
Even without a future increase to the 
employer contribution, combined savings 
rates for KiwiSaver members could reach 
13% of pay, a substantial increase on the 
current 6% combined default.
Auto-escalation would acknowledge the 
bounded rationality and passive decision 
making of individuals in contribution 
decisions by simplifying the complex 
problem of increasing savings down to 
making it the standard default option. It 
also takes account of inertia/procrastination 
in that it minimises the cognitive load 
required to increase contributions by fully 
automating the process. Also, as it would 
not necessarily require any future 
contribution choices or actions, concerns 
around status quo bias are also mitigated. 
Requiring and scheduling a current 
commitment to future contribution rate 
increases mitigates the present bias issues 
inhibiting individuals from increasing their 
rate voluntarily. Loss aversion is also taken 
into account by the escalations being 
unlikely to ever materially reduce take 
home pay, as a result of annual wage 
growth likely being higher than the 0.5% 
annual escalations. 
Exact design details of an auto-
escalation system, such as measures to 
ensure low-income earners do not end up 
saving more than they can afford and 
enabling existing members to participate, 
are beyond the discussion here, other than 
to note that an opt-out mechanism would 
be retained. However, as the SMarT 
findings above show, auto-escalation could 
result in substantially higher contribution 
rates and increased retirement savings for 
KiwiSaver members over time, especially if 
combined with the changes to the default 
funds discussed above.
Policy proposals
In light of the research findings, 
behaviourally informed notifications 
should be used across multiple mediums 
and at different times by default providers, 
consistent with the Financial Markets 
Authority’s work on behavioural trials. 
Likewise, when the KiwiSaver default 
system is next reviewed, a target date 
fund allocation should replace the current 
conservative KiwiSaver default fund. 
Failing this, at the least the default fund 
should represent a balanced fund so as to 
reduce the gap between investment mix 
members’ future retirement savings and 
those of other members who have actively 
selected their funds.
To ensure no default member is 
negatively affected by such changes to the 
system, all current default members should 
be transferred out and into the applicable 
default target date fund within one year of 
commencement, or, if directed by members, 
transferred to their provider’s non-default 
conservative fund. Finally, as contribution 
rates are one of the most important factors 
in attaining sufficient retirement savings, 
the current default contribution rate of 3% 
should be replaced with an auto-escalation 
system, similar to SMarT, to increase future 
and current member contribution rates.
Conclusion
Default members tend to have trouble with 
complex KiwiSaver decisions, passively 
take the path or option of least resistance 
and delay or procrastinate making a 
conscious fund choice. KiwiSaver has 
and will continue to create and provide 
sufficient retirement savings for some 
individuals, in many cases beyond that 
which would have been achieved in the 
absence of the programme. However, the 
evidence shows that when combined with 
the default low contribution rate, the 
conservative default funds pose a serious 
risk that default members may achieve 
insufficient retirement savings and lower 
standards of living in retirement than 
expected or desired. In the interests of 
New Zealanders’ futures, these concerns 
should not go unheeded any longer. 
1 All views, opinions, findings and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed are strictly those of the author. 
They do not reflect the views of MBIE or the New Zealand 
government. The ministry and the New Zealand government 
take no responsibility for any errors or omissions in, or for 
the correctness of, the information contained in this research.
Simply getting employees to think about 
the consequences of savings inadequacy 
is insufficient to produce meaningful 
behavioural change.
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